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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Act provided that the only place in which an arbitration award or
agreement can be questioned is in the court in which said award was
filed or is fileable. 209 The New York court concluded that the existence
and effect of the stipulation upon which City Trade based its defense
were issues solely for the determination of the Indian court. 210
[O]nce parties have agreed to submit their controversy to a foreign
arbitrator, and to be bound by foreign law, they cannot relitigate
their claims or defenses in domestic litigation.211
Not viewing the stipulation as an agreement for settlement in other
than the Indian court,212 the New York court granted summary judg-
ment to New Central.213
The disposition of this case is just both in fact and in law: City
Trade deliberately determined not to participate in any of the pro-
ceedings in India, and the stipulation upon which it depended was not
an agreement to resolve the controversy otherwise than in the Indian
court.
ARTICLE 65- NOTICE OF PENDENCY
CPLR 6501: Second filing of notice of pendency authorized to permit
action to foreclose real property mortgage.
In any action in which the judgment would affect title, posses-
sion, use, or enjoyment of real property, a notice of pendency may be
filed pursuant to CPLR article 65.214 This serves as constructive notice
from the time of filing to purchasers from or incumbrancers against
the defendant.21 5 The life span of an unextended notice of pendency
is three years,2 '6 the granting of a motion to cancel such a notice being
obligatory upon the court.217 Only one notice of pendency predicated
upon a particular cause of action may be filed under CPLR 6501. 213
209 Id. at 656-57, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
210 Id. at 657, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 985-86.
211 Id. at 655-56, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 983, citing Engelbrechten v. Galvanconi & Nevy Bros.,
Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 721, 300 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969); Plugmay, Ltd.
v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1966).
212 Id. at 657, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
213 Id. at 658, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
214 CPLR 6501-6515 outlines procedures for obtaining, filing, and cancelling notice
of pendency.
215 CPLR 6501.
216 CPLR 6513 is self-executing: failure to obtain an extension results in the death
of the notice.
217 Robbins v. Goldstein, 32 App. Div. 2d 1047, 303 N.Y.S.2d 822 (2d Dep't 1969)
found this mandate inherent in the language of CPLR 6514. See McLaughlin, New York
Practice, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 81 (1971); 7B McKINNEY'$ CPLR 6514, supp. commentary
at 74 (1970). See also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 532, 578-79 (1970).
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A unique problem arises, however, in an action to foreclose a
real property mortgage wherein RPAPL 1331 requires the filing of a
notice of pendency at least twenty days before final judgment of fore-
closure and sale. Herein, the notice is not a privilege for the plaintiff,
but a protection of the interests of third parties. 219 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirming the Supreme Court, Kings
County, found this distinction controlling in Robbins v. Goldstein.220
It held that previous cancellation of the original notice filed by the
plaintiff221 did not prevent him from satisfying RPAPL 1331.222 Prece-
dent for allowing a new notice of pendency to be filed was found in
Brandow v. Vroman223 and Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Hail.22 4 Those
cases which held that a second notice could not be filed after cancella-
tion 225 were distinguished. Since they did not involve mortgage fore-
closure actions, the filing of a notice of pendency therein was merely
an added special privilege rather than a prerequisite to entry of final
judgment.22 6 The court further noted that the clear intent of those
decisions was to restrict the special privilege granted by CPLR 6501
and its predecessor statutes, not to destroy the cause of action entirely.227
The court's distinction is well reasoned. Actions to foreclose mort-
gages are not dependent upon CPLR 6501. With the obligation im-
posed by R.PAPL 1331 to file a notice of pendency in such actions,
must lie the authority for the filing. While the privilege of notice of
pendency can only be exercised once under CPLR 6501, the bar on
renewal should not operate to frustrate compliance with RPAPL 1331
and thereby bar an entire cause of action.
2 18 The filing of a notice of pendency under CPLR 6501 is considered an extra-
ordinary privilege. A plaintiff may not allow the notice to lapse and then continue the
privilege by subsequently filing a second notice. Israelson v. Bradley, 808 N.Y. 511, 127
NX.2d 313 (1955); see Frumer, Civil Remedies and Procedure, 80 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1647, 1663
(1955); 31 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 136 (1956).
219 "An action to foreclose a mortgage on real property is seriously affected by the
inability of the plaintiff to have a notice of pendency of action on file at least twenty days
prior to judgment. In fact, plaintiff is unable to obtain a judgment of foreclosure and
sale unless a notice is on file." Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 163 N.Y.L.J. 40, Mar. 2,
1970, at 27, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County).
220 86 App. Div. 2d 730, 820 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2d Dep't 1971).
2 2 1 See Robbins v. Goldstein, 32 App. Div. 2d 1047, 303 N.Y.S.2d 822 (2d Dep't 1969).
222 36 App. Div. 2d at 781, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
225 22 Misc. 870, 50 N.Y.S. 828 (Sup. Ct. Albany County), rev'd on another ground,
29 App. Div. 597, 51 N.YS. 943 (3d Dep't 1898).
224 168 N.Y.J. 40, Mar. 2, 1970, at 27, col. 2. (Sup. Ct. Kings County).
225 See, e.g., Israelson v. Bradley, 808 N.Y. 511, 127 N.E.2d 818 (1955); Lanzoff v.
Bader, 18 App. Div. 2d 995, 216 N.Y.S.2d 632 (2d Dep't. 1961); Cohan v. Ratkowsky, 48
App. Div. 196, 59 N.Y.S. 344 (1st Dep't 1899).
226 36 App. Div. 2d at 781, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
227Id. citing Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N.Y. 511, 127 N.EZ2d 313 (1955); Cohen v.
Bider, 123 App. Div. 528, 108 N.Y.S. 244 (2d Dep't 1908).
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